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Abstract
The determinants of international currency received a lot of attention since the
great recession. Classic literature focused on economy size and openness, but that
couldn’t explain why RMB remains largely national, while China is already leading in
international trade. In this paper, I verified the importance of financial development
for currency internationalization using SWIFT trade finance data. Then I built a two-
country monetary search model, where trade takes time, and lack of commitment makes
exporter and importer rely on bank-intermediated finance. The agent’s currency choice
is related with terms of trade, monetary policy, and financial efficiency. Optimal mon-
etary policy differs according to currency regime. Related topic such as size effect and
global imbalance is also discussed.
∗I’m indebted to Wing Woo and Athanasios Geromichalos for continuous guidance and support. Data
help from SWIFT Institute is greatly appreciated. I also thank Paul Bergin, Katheryn Russ, Colin Carter,
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1 Introduction
The international monetary system came under serious doubt after the global financial crisis
in 2008. Many alternatives have been proposed to replace the exorbitant privilege of US
dollar, such as SDR (Zhou, 2009), a multipolar system (Eichengreen, 2011), and a single
world currency (Mundell, 2012). Academic research on the determinants of international
currency traditionally emphasized economy size and openness, but historical experience
shows another picture. US GDP surpassed Great Britain in 1870s, and US share of world
export surged to 22.1% in 1913, but the international role of US dollar was essentially zero,
while Sterling still invoiced over 60% of world trade by early twentieth century (Broz, 1997).
The establishment of FED is believed to speed up the rise of USD with its favorable policy
to develop financial market and provide trade credit (Eichengreen and Flandreau, 2012).
In this paper I show that a currency would never become international without a sound
financial market, which could explain why RMB remains largely national, while China is
already leading in international trade.
To that end, I first verify the importance of financial development for a currency to
be widely used in cross-border trade, using trade finance data from SWIFT (Society for
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication). A two-country monetary search model
is then built to explain this finding. In model, goods are delivered one period after contract,
and the lack of commitment calls for bank to provide liquidity to exporter with the fund
from investor, who would later get payoff from importer. Banking sector operates at a fixed
cost, and exporter receives liquidity at discount, so he would choose the currency with a
higher level of profit. Consequently, a currency is never used in international trade if the
issuing country doesn’t have a liquid and efficient financial market.
Three currency regimes emerge from the model’s equilibrium: single international cur-
rency (SIC), producer currency settlement (PCS), and local currency settlement (LCS). The
welfare function consists of gains from domestic trade, international trade, and seigniorage
revenue if there’s foreign demand of currency, as in SIC and PCS. For a central bank try-
ing to maximize total welfare, Friedman rule is not necessarily optimal given the trade-off
between gains from trade and seigniorage revenue. In addition, the relationship between
optimal inflation level and economy size is hump-shaped for the issuing country of interna-
tional currency: for a relatively large or small economy, seigniorage revenue is dwarfed by
gains from domestic or international trade, so lower inflation is better choice.
Moreover, this model provides an intuitive explanation for global imbalance character-
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ized by the persistent current account deficit of US. Consider a symmetric model with two
countries identical in every aspect except that country 1 currency is the single interna-
tional currency. Country 1 resident would hold more of his home currency since it’s used
in both domestic and international trade. In contrast, country 2 resident would hold less
of country 1 currency since he could use it only in cross-border transaction. As a result,
the over-consumption tendency of country 1 leads to its trade deficit. This model therefore
implies that global imbalance is partially accredited to the status of USD as the dominant
international currency.
For definition, a currency becomes international when it’s used by foreigners in locations
outside of the issuing country. As store of value, it could be central bank’s foreign reserve
or private agent’s investment instrument. As medium of exchange, it could smooth gov-
ernment’s foreign exchange intervention or settle international trade. As unit of account,
it denominates financial transaction or becomes the anchor of other currencies. Table 1
summarized all these functions. This paper focused on the international currency used as
medium of exchange1.
Table 1: International function of money
For government For private use
Store of value international reserve investment instrument
Medium of exchange FX intervention transaction of good/asset
Unit of account currency anchor asset denomination
1In practice, there’s a lot of difference among pricing, invoicing, and settlement currency, although the-
oretical model usually takes them as equivalent. Pricing or invoicing currency might be considered as unit
of account, while settlement currency is naturally classified as medium of exchange. Friberg and Wilander
(2008) conducted a questionnaire study on the currency choice of Swedish exporter in 2006, and most firms
reported to use the same currency in over 90% of their revenue. Of course, the discrepancy could be large,
especially for developing countries. Reiss (2015) found that, for Brazil real, its use as invoicing currency
is more than settlement currency, whereas Yu (2013) suggested that RMB was used more as settlement
currency than invoicing currency.
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Academic research on international currency spans economics and politics. Interested
reader could refer to Be´nassy-Que´re´ (2015) for a systematic review. For economic theories
that regarded international currency as the outcome of decentralized choice by private agent,
they could be loosely classified into trade models, invoicing currency models, and search
models.
Trade models mostly used 3-country or N-country general equilibrium to explain the
phenomenon of international vehicle currency (IVC) ( Rey, 2001; Devereux and Shi, 2013).
In models of this fashion, producer and consumer hold only home currency, and for-
eign exchange transaction is undertaken by financial intermediary or trading post with an
increasing-return-to-scale technology that lowers transaction cost with a large trade volume.
Under the assumption of cash in advance and PCS, agent’s currency choice is exogenously
given. The existence of a general equilibrium with IVC is crucially dependent on economic
openness. Therefore, the currency issued by a country intensively engaged in international
trade would emerge as IVC. This thick market externality also makes the status of IVC a
natural monopoly. The advantage of such model comes from its nature of general equilib-
rium: the welfare gain of using IVC could be analyzed, and discussion on optimal monetary
policy is feasible. Lack of micro-foundation, however, constitutes an obvious drawback:
agent’s currency choice is exogenously given, so it’s impossible to explain the rise and fall
of different currency regimes.
Invoicing currency models endogenized currency choice by allowing exporters to set price
before exchange rate shock is realized. For PCP, there’s uncertainty in foreign demand and
production cost, while LCP makes future price unpredictable. So exporters choose invoicing
currency mainly to mitigate exchange rate risk. Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2005) showed
that producer’s currency choice is affected by competition in foreign markets: higher level
of exporter’s market share and differentiation tends to promote PCP. Goldberg and Tille
(2008, 2013) continued this approach to include vehicle currency, and the determinants of
invoicing currency include exporter’s motive to limit output volatility, hedge macroeconomic
volatility, and reduce transaction cost. For all its success, invoicing currency model is not
explicit about the underlying process of currency circulation, and its nature of partial
equilibrium also limits welfare analysis.
Search theory focused on the rise of fiat money as medium of exchange. Earlier studies
in this field employed two-country two-currency model, but suffered from the indivisibility
of output and money (Matsuyama et al., 1993) or inability to reach equilibrium (Trejos
and Wright, 1996). With the breakthrough in Lagos and Wright (2005), search theory is
now widely applied to topics in international macroeconomics such as home bias puzzle
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(Geromichalos and Simonovska, 2014) and UIP puzzle (Jung and Lee, 2015) 2. This paper
is closest in methodology to Lester et al. (2012) and Zhang (2014) that used information
theory to discuss the determinants of international currency and its implication for monetary
policy.
This paper also follows a long tradition of explicitly modeling bank and credit since
Diamond and Dybvig (1983). One difficulty in this field is the conflict between money
and credit, as pointed out by Berentsen et al. (2007). There must be an absence of record
keeping for money to be essential, but credit requires record keeping in case of default3.
The inherent tension between money and credit is not present in this model thanks to the
institutional setup of trade finance: importer has no incentive to default since that would
deny him the ownership of goods. Money could coexist with credit without record keeping,
and credit improves welfare by facilitating trade.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Part 2 presents an empirical analysis of
international currency use in cross-border trade. Part 3 describes model environment and
defines monetary equilibrium. Part 4 undergoes discussion on related topic with numerical
example. Part 5 concludes.
2 An empirical analysis with SWIFT dataset
This part documents the practice of trade finance and takes advantage of SWIFT dataset
to emphasize the importance of financial development for currency internationalization.
2.1 International trade finance
The timing of payment and delivery is always a big issue for international trade. Without
mutual trust or history record, the direct trade between buyer and seller would bring in
a lot of uncertainty: buyers don’t know whether they could get goods after payment, and
sellers are not guaranteed that they would get paid after delivery. According to the timing
2This class of model has a large concern on asset, usually supplied in the manner of Lucas tree. The asset
plays as both store of value in its claim to future output, and medium of exchange in acting as collateral to
facilitate trade. My model is focused on fiat money as medium of exchange so asset pricing only has minor,
if not trivial, effect on equilibrium condition. Moreover, buyer is assumed to get goods one period after
contract, so he would never give asset to seller as payment without further guarantee.
3This conflict is solved in Berentsen et al. (2007) by assuming banks are able to record financial transaction
but not goods trade, so fiat money still circulates as medium of exchange but credit becomes feasible. Bignon
et al. (2013) continued this approach to discuss the implication for currency union and financial integration.
However, search model in this fashion still forces foreign consumption to be settled by foreign currency or
credit, so it’s improper for the discussion of international currency.
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of payment and delivery, trade finance could be classified into Cash-in-advance (payment
before delivery), Open account (payment after delivery), and Bank trade finance. If buyer
and seller trust each other, cash-in-advance or open account would be a better choice with
relatively lower transaction cost. If sellers don’t trust buyer but believe the credit of buyer’s
bank, bank-intermediated finance could help facilitate international trade. Committee on
the Global Financial System (2014) estimated that bank trade finance directly supports
about one-third of global trade. One mainstream instrument covering half of bank trade
finance is letter of credit (LC). Figure 1 illustrates its mechanism, and detailed procedures
are relegated to appendix.
Figure 1: Mechanism of LC
Source: adapted from Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2014)
The timing mismatch between shipment and payment is easily solved by LC: exporter
gets timely fund once he shows shipment document and importer is charged only after the
delivery of goods. Holding LC is not attractive for banks given its average maturity of 2-3
months, but investors would be interested in this short-term asset with its payment guaran-
teed by bank credit. So banks would package LC as trade acceptance and sell it to investors.
In the end, banks facilitate international trade by playing the role of intermediation among
exporter, importer, and investor.
2.2 Empirical analysis of international currency use in trade
With better data availability in recent years, cross-country analysis of trade invoicing cur-
rency becomes feasible, and the leading research includes Kamps (2006), Goldberg and
6
Tille (2008), Ito and Chinn (2013), and Gopinath (2015). They collect data mainly from
the survey of central bank and statistical institute. The importance of market share, product
differentiation, and financial development is generally verified. One fallacy of this approach,
however, comes from the measurement inconsistency among central banks. Also, its sample
size is quite limited, covering only 35 countries and regions.
SWIFT trade finance dataset provides an innovative insight on the currency use of
cross-border transaction. It involves 227 countries and regions with detailed information
on trade settlement currency. Table 2 is a summary of currency use for several countries
and regions. Not surprisingly, US export and import is predominantly settled by USD.
With the exception of Germany, most countries use USD as vehicle currency to settle their
international trade. China made progress in setting its import with home currency, but not
so for export4.
Table 2: Currency use of international trade
Export Import
PCS LCS VCS PCS LCS VCS
US 98.89% 2.64% 0.37% 1.49% 98.43% 0.08%
UK 2.59% 5.21% 92.20% 7.61% 7.41% 84.98%
Germany 47.51% 5.26% 47.23% 2.74% 25.18% 72.08%
France 32.34% 2.09% 65.57% 3.91% 8.10% 88.00%
Japan 33.71% 6.43% 59.87% 9.70% 8.93% 81.37%
Canada 4.25% 8.95% 86.79% 16.19% 20.05% 63.76%
Australia 1.14% 9.35% 89.51% 8.12% 12.91% 78.97%
China 0.69% 7.10% 92.22% 10.81% 23.22% 65.97%
OPEC 6.35% 9.43% 84.23% 25.27% 0.67% 74.06%
OECD without US 17.67% 7.26% 75.07% 10.20% 6.20% 83.60%
Eurozone 37.90% 4.03% 58.07% 3.91% 14.37% 81.71%
World 11.98% 13.37% 74.65% 13.37% 11.98% 74.65%
Notes: Statistics calculated from sample average between 2010 October and 2014 August, using MT400&700
message in SWIFT dataset. PCS for producer currency settlement; LCS for local currency settlement; VCS for
vehicle currency settlement, mainly USD in this dataset. Intra Euro-zone trade excluded. Transaction among
mainland China, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan regarded as international.
4There should be some caution with the interpretation of table 2. Although letter of credit is estimated
to directly support one sixth of total merchandise trade, its coverage is unbalanced across regions. Less than
10% of US export is linked with bank trade finance, whereas Asian countries heavily relies on it. This is
also true for mainland China: around 30% of its import is financed by letter of credit, but that share is less
than 10% for export. For comparison, data from PBOC and China’s custom showed that 20.94% of China’s
merchandise trade was settled by RMB in 2015 November.
7
Table 3 provides panel regression analysis for the determinants of trade settlement cur-
rency. Two indicators are used as proxy for financial development: private credit over GDP,
and Chinn-Ito index that measures capital account openness. It’s obvious from regression
outcome that financial market development matters for currency use in cross-border trade:
private credit over GDP is statistically significant for both export and import, with ex-
pected sign. This means, all else equal, a sound financial market promotes wider use of its
currency in international trade5. The following part would build a two-country monetary
search model to explain this finding.
Table 3: Determinants of trade settlement currency, 2011-2013
Export Import
Total OECD Non-OECD Total OECD Non-OECD
Activity share -1.788 1.224 -1.087 0.967 -2.045 1.490
Inflation 0.000 -0.006 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.002
Inflation volatility 0.001 0.002 -0.0002 0.001 -0.002 0.011
Exchange rate (per USD) -0.037*** -0.077*** -0.020*** -0.021** -0.039*** -0.011
Exchange rate volatility -0.154 0.112 -0.652 -0.146 -0.176 0.404
Private credit / GDP 0.128*** -0.035 0.099*** 0.087*** 0.816* 0.100**
Chinn-Ito index 0.051 0.213 0.012 0.151*** 0.069 0.156**
Product differentiation -0.012 -0.062 -0.019 -0.030 -0.047 -0.102
Real GDP 0.061*** 0.004 0.036*** 0.017 0.002 0.014
Constant -2.051*** 0.151 -1.323*** -0.948*** -0.347 -1.038
N 319 76 243 334 79 255
N (uncensored) 131 66 65 124 64 60
Note: US not included in sample. Data frequency is annual. Dependent variable is the share of a country’s export/import settled
in home currency. Econometric method is panel Tobit, since SWIFT dataset is restricted for confidentiality purpose: if the monthly
transaction number for a country pair is less than or equal to 4, it’s recorded as 0. Detailed description of independent variable in
appendix.
3 The Model
3.1 Environment
Time is discrete and infinite. There are two countries in the world, 1 and 2, each populated
with a unit measure of buyer, seller, and investor, who live forever with a discount factor
of β ∈ (0, 1). Their identity is fixed over time and their respective population is σ, σ,
5It must be cautioned here that regression significance implies correlation rather than causality. So it’s
safer to conclude that financial market development is a necessary but not sufficient condition for currency
internationalization.
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and (1 − 2σ). In addition, each country has a perfect competitive banking sector. Each
period is divided into three rounds of centralized market (CM), decentralized market (DM),
and financial market (FM). There is divisible and storable fiat money circulating in each
country, and its total supply evolves according to Mˆi = (1+µi)Mi, where Mi is the stock of
country i’s fiat money in current period, and variable with a hat is the level in next period.
The growth rate of money supply, µi, is under the control of central bank.
Here I start with brief introduction on model, and a formal description would follow.
In DM, sellers are specialized in the production of a perishable differentiated good q but
unable to consume it, while buyers are able to consume but couldn’t produce. Due to
imperfect credit and lack of record, a medium of exchange is necessary. Moreover, q is
delivered only at the beginning of next period. Assume domestic agents know each other
very well so they agree on the use of open account for settlement, whereas agents from
different countries don’t trust each other, so settlement is facilitated by bank-intermediated
finance. For international trade, buyers ask bank to issue LC, and sellers get immediate
liquidity from bank after showing required document of shipment. In FM, only investors
could purchase trade acceptance, which is a one-period nominal bond issued by bank, with
a total payoff equal to buyer’s future payment. At the beginning of next period, buyers
make payment to get q, and investors receive payoff for their holding of trade acceptance.
In the following CM, buyer, seller, and investor engage in the production of a perishable
nume´raire good X and adjust their holdings of fiat money. The timing of model is depicted
in figure 2.
Figure 2: Model timing
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Now I will begin to formalize the setup of physical environment. For tractability, assume
the instantaneous utility function for buyer, seller, and investor in two countries is the
following
UB = u(q) + U(X)−H
US = −c(q) + U(X)−H
U I = U(X)−H
where q, X, and H capture the amount of specialized good, nume´raire good, and working
hour. While every agent could produce nume´raire good with a linear technology of X = H,
only sellers could produce differentiated good at the cost of c(q). It’s further assumed that
the optimal consumption in CM is X∗, such that U ′(X∗) = 1. The conventional assumption
on function form also holds, so u(0) = c(0) = 0, u′(0) = +∞, c′(0) = 0, u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, c′ >
0, c′′ > 0. For notations below, i, j = {1, 2}, i 6= j. The real value of country i’s fiat money
in terms of nume´raire good is φi. This model is focused on stationary monetary equilibrium
where the aggregate real balance is constant, therefore 1 + µi =
φi
φˆi
. Central banks adjust
home currency supply through lump-sum transfer to domestic agent when CM opens.
There is separate DM in each country. Buyers could go abroad with a probability of
(1 − α) while sellers stay at home. Buyer and seller meet pairwise and at random, with a
matching function of Ni =
BiSi
Bi+Si
, where Ni is the number of successful matching in country
i, with Bi and Si for the number of buyer and seller in country i’s DM. With this matching
function, the number of meeting between country i buyer and country j seller (nij), as well
as the probability for country i buyer to meet country j seller (pij) could be determined. DM
in this model functions as international trade market. FM is segmented by capital control.
The banking sector in country i could issue LC denominated in its home currency. The total
cost (Fi) is assumed to be fixed to reflect economy of scale. Fi is also a proxy for financial
development. FM in this model represents financial market for short-term investment.
In contrast, CM is open to buyer, seller, and investor from both countries. This Wal-
rasian market allows agents to adjust their holding of home and foreign currency, so it’s
similar to a frictionless foreign exchange market6. Additionally, since central bank’s lump-
sum transfer is only for domestic agents, extracting seigniorage revenue through inflation is
possible only when a certain currency is demanded by foreigners.
6This is certainly not without loss of generality, as discussed in Geromichalos and Jung (2015)
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The currency regime is endogenized by seller’s binary choice of settlement currency 7. If
financial frictions make international trade unprofitable, international currency would never
emerge. Otherwise, sellers would choose whichever currency that brings a higher level of
profit.
3.2 Optimal choice and equilibrium
3.2.1 CM Value function
Agent’s CM value function differs according to his type. For buyer, he would want to hold
money at the end of CM to enjoy differentiated good in next period, therefore the CM
maximization problem for buyer in country i is
WBi (φim
i
i, φjm
i
j) = max
mˆii,mˆ
i
j ,H,X
U(X)−H + βE[V Bi (φˆimˆii, φˆjmˆij)]
s.t. φimˆ
i
i + φjmˆ
i
j +X ≤ H + φimii + φjmij + Ti
where mij is country i buyer’s holding of country j currency; V
B
i is country i buyer’s value
function for DM trade; Ti is the lump-sum transfer from country i central bank. This CM
value function could be simplified as
WBi = U(X)−X + φimii + φjmij + Ti + max
mˆii,mˆ
i
j
{
βE[V Bi (φˆimˆii, φˆjmˆij)]− φimˆii − φjmˆij
}
With the observation that buyer’s value function is linear in his holding of money, further
simplify this into
WBi (φim
i
i, φjm
i
j) = W
B
i (0, 0) + φim
i
i + φjm
i
j
For sellers, they don’t have any incentive to hold money in CM since the liquidity he would
get from bank is irrelevant with his holding of money. So CM value function for seller is
constant with respect to his own money holding.
7Here I assume away the possibility that sellers accept both currencies at the same time, for two reasons.
First, that doesn’t happen very often in reality, given that LC is mostly issued in a single currency. Second,
this assumption makes model tractable in the case of indeterminacy. In my model, sellers would choose
home currency if both currencies bring the same level of positive profit. In Zhang (2014), accepting home
currency doesn’t incur additional information cost for seller, so accepting both currencies is possible. In
this model, accepting home currency is also costly for international trade, so sellers would choose a single
currency for settlement.
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With similar notations, the CM value function for country i investor is
W Ii (zi) = max
zˆi,aˆi,H,X
U(X)−H + βE[V Ii (zˆi, aˆi)]
s.t. φizˆi +X ≤ H + φizi + Ti
where V Ii (mˆi, aˆi) is the value function for investor in financial market, related with his
holding of home currency (zˆi) and trade acceptance (aˆi) for next period. Similarly, this
value function could be simplified into
W Ii (zi) = W
I
i (0) + φizi
3.2.2 Terms of trade in DM
Buyer and seller make a proportional bargaining in DM to determine terms of trade. Buyer’s
utility maximization problem is
max
q,d(m)
{u(q)− φd(m)}
s.t. u(q)−φd(m)
φd(m)− c(q)
β
= θ1−θ
d(m) ≤ m
where q is the amount of differentiated good sellers would produce; d(m) is the amount of
fiat money buyers would pay to sellers; θ is buyer’s bargaining power. Since buyers make
payment only when q is delivered at the beginning of next period, seller’s surplus is adjusted
by discount factor. The solution is
d(m) =
m∗ if φm >
c(q∗)
β
m if φm ≤ c(q∗)β
where q∗ is the level of consumption that would maximize total surplus such that βu′(q∗) =
c′(q∗); m∗ is buyer’s payment when total surplus is maximized, so φm∗ = (1−θ)u(q∗)+θ c(q∗)β .
It will become clear in equilibrium that buyer’s holding of fiat money would never exceed
m∗, because excessive money doesn’t increase his gains from trade, but would incur a loss
from inflation. Therefore, buyer’s payment to seller is φm = (1 − θ)u(q) + θ c(q)β , with
q ≤ q∗, βu′(q∗) = c′(q∗).
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3.2.3 Investor decision in FM
Country i investor’s profit maximization problem in FM is
max
ai
{zi + (yi − pi)ai}
s.t. piai ≤ zi
where pi and yi are nominal price and payoff of trade acceptance issued by country i’s
banking sector. Notice that investor is risk-neutral since his CM value function is linear in
z, so he would only want to maximize his expected level of wealth. Individual investor’s
demand for trade acceptance is
ai =
0 if yi < pizi/pi if yi ≥ pi
This result is intuitive: if the payoff is lower than cost, investor’s demand would be zero.
For country i investor, the total demand for trade acceptance is D = (1 − 2σ)ai . The
total payoff of trade acceptance in country i should be equal to buyer’s total payment for
international trade settled in country i currency, so the total supply of trade acceptance is
S =
sinjim
j
i+(1−sj)nijmii
yi
.
At equilibrium, if trade acceptance is attractive to investor, its payoff must be no less
than price, so yipi =
sinjim
j
i+(1−sj)nijmii
(1−2σ)zi ≥ 1.
3.2.4 Financial constraint and seller’s decision
More importantly, the addition of bank and investor imposed financial constraint for mon-
etary equilibrium that allows for international trade. The immediate liquidity provided by
bank must be able to cover seller’s DM cost. Given a perfect competitive banking sector,
zero profit condition holds, so this immediate liquidity is equal to the proceedings from
selling trade acceptance, net of banking sector’s fixed cost. Consequently, country i seller’s
gain from international trade settled in home currency is
pii ≡
[
1− Fi
(1− 2σ)φizi
](
1
1 +Ri
)
φim
j
i − c(qji )
where Ri ≡ φiβφˆi − 1 is the nominal interest rate of country i, and q
j
i is country j buyer’s
purchase of differentiated good settled in country i currency.
From this result, seller’s revenue in DM trade is affected by three factors. First, terms
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of trade from proportional bargaining, φim
j
i . Second, discount factor of (1+Ri)
−1. Finally,
financial friction influenced by the fixed cost of banking sector (Fi) and financial market
liquidity of (1−2σ)φizi. Intuitively, fixed cost is negatively correlated with seller’s revenue,
while an increase of financial market liquidity could help improve seller’s profit from DM
trade.
As shown later, inflation has negative impact on these factors at the same time. For
terms of trade, higher inflation would reduce buyer’s trade volume and real balance holding;
for discount factor, it erodes the value of future payment; for financial friction, it tends to
depress investor’s confidence, thus lowering their purchase of trade acceptance. In short,
higher inflation would get amplified by financial market and hugely deteriorate exporter’s
welfare.
Similarly, country i seller’s profit from international trade settled in foreign currency is
pi∗i ≡
[
1− Fj
(1− 2σ)φjzj
](
1
1 +Rj
)
φjm
j
j − c(qjj )
With these in mind, country i sellers choose settlement currency8.
autarky if max{pii, pi∗i } < 0
si = 1 if max{pii, pi∗i } ≥ 0, pii ≥ pi∗i
si = 0 if max{pii, pi∗i } ≥ 0, pii < pi∗i
(1)
Finally, currency regime comes from seller’s decision. If {s1, s2} = {1, 0} or {0, 1},
there’s a single international currency (SIC); if {s1, s2} = {1, 1}, both currencies become
international, and seller would use home currency for trade settlement, which is producer
currency settlement (PCS); if {s1, s2} = {0, 0}, there are two international currencies, and
international trade is settled by importer’s home currency, which is local currency settlement
(LCS). Currency regime is summarized in table 4.
8Here I didn’t consider the asymmetric case when international trade is profitable for country i seller
but not for country j seller, just for the sake of simplicity. It’s quite easy to include that case and related
discussion would be straightforward.
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Table 4: Currency regime
Regime Seller’s choice Description
SIC {s1, s2} = {1, 0}
{s2, s1} = {1, 0}
Country 1 currency is international
Country 2 currency is international
PCS {s1, s2} = {1, 1} Two international currencies
Trade settled in seller’s home currency
LCS {s1, s2} = {0, 0} Two international currencies
Trade settled in buyer’s home currency
3.2.5 Optimal choice for buyer and investor
For buyer and investor, the optimal holding of real balance is available after combining CM
and DM value function. For country i buyer, his DM value function is
V Bi =
(
pii + (1− sj)pij
)(
u(qii)− φimii
)
+ pijsj
(
u(qij)− φjmij
)
+WBi
where (pii + (1− sj)pij
)(
u(qii)− φimii
)
is country i buyer’s expected surplus for DM trade
settled in country i currency, while pijsj
(
u(qij) − φjmij
)
is his expected surplus for trade
settled in country j currency.
Substitute this into the expression of buyer’s CM value function, then his maximization
problem becomes
max
mˆii,mˆ
i
j
{
(βφˆi − φi)mˆii + β
(
pii + (1− sj)pij
)
θ
[
u(qˆii)−
c(qˆii)
β
]
+(βφˆj − φj)mˆij + βsjpijθ
[
u(qˆij)−
c(qˆij)
β
]}
Several conventional observation in monetary search model would also apply here. For
example, the solution for maximization problem requires βφˆi − φi < 0 and m < m∗. The
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first order condition for home currency is
Ri = (pii + (1− sj)pij)
[
θ(u′(qii)− c′(qii)/β)
(1− θ)u′(qii) + θc′(qii)/β
]
(2)
This first order condition means buyer’s marginal cost of holding money (Ri) must be
equal to the expected marginal benefit. Notice that buyer’s demand for home currency is
positive since his meeting with domestic sellers would always use home currency as medium
of exchange. This is not true for foreign currency, which depends on foreign seller’s decision.
qij = 0 if sj = 0
Rj = pij
[
θ(u′(qij)−c′(qij)/β)
(1−θ)u′(qij)+θc′(qij)/β
]
if sj = 1
(3)
For simplicity, define L(q) ≡ θ(u′(q)−c′(q)/β)(1−θ)u′(q)+θc′(q)/β as liquidity premium. Apply the same pro-
cedure to investor’s maximization problem, and combine the first order condition with
equilibrium level of yi/pi, I could get investor’s optimal holding of home currency.
zi = 0 if {si, sj} = {0, 1}
Ri =
sinjiφim
j
i+(1−sj)nijφimii
(1−2σ)φizi − 1, otherwise
(4)
This result is also intuitive: if home currency never became international, investor wouldn’t
hold any of that; otherwise, investor’s marginal cost of holding home currency should be
equal to the rate of return from trade acceptance.
Lastly, money market should clear after agents make choice. Consider the case when
international trade is profitable. ∀i, j = {1, 2}, i 6= j
σφim
i
i = φiMi if {si, sj} = {0, 1}
σφim
i
i + (1− 2σ)φizi + Fi = φiMi if {si, sj} = {0, 0}
σφim
i
i + σφim
j
i + (1− 2σ)φizi + Fi = φiMi if {si, sj} = {1, 0}, {1, 1}
(5)
For the first case, country i currency remains national, so its demand comes from only
domestic buyer. For the second case of LCS, its demand comes from home buyer, home
investor, and banking sector. For the last case, home buyer, home investor, foreign buyer,
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and banking sector would all demand for country i currency.
3.2.6 Monetary equilibrium of international trade
With agent’s optimal choice, now it’s possible to define a stationary monetary equilibrium.
My main concern is the emergence of international currency, so I would focus on the equi-
librium that allows for international trade.
Definition 1 A stationary monetary equilibrium that allows for international trade is
a list of time-invariant values including trade volume {qij}2i,j=1, investor’s holding of real
balance {φizi}2i=1, and seller’s choice of settlement currency {si}2i=1 such that, given other
agent’s behavior,
1. Seller’s choice of {si}2i=1 solves (1);
2. Buyer’s choice of {qij}2i,j=1 solves (2)(3);
3. Investor’s choice of {φizi}2i=1 solves (4);
4. Money market clears so that (5) holds.
3.3 Hegemony and incumbency advantage
Now consider the case of hegemony when country 1 currency becomes international while
country 2 currency remains national (s1 = 1, s2 = 0). Country 1 would be referred to as
center country while country 2 as peripheral country. Intuitively, country 1 buyer would
never hold foreign currency since his home currency is universally acknowledged and ap-
preciated. In contrast, country 2 buyer would hold home currency for domestic trade and
foreign currency for international trade. Moreover, the single international currency makes
financial market active only in country 1. Consistent with definition 1, equilibrium condi-
tion is explicitly shown in appendix. There is incumbency advantage of country 1 in this
international monetary system. Due to the economy of scale in banking sector, country 2
currency would never become international without collective action, government promo-
tion, or a sudden shock that drains financial market liquidity in country 1. This observation
is reflected in proposition 1.
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Proposition 1 If country 1 currency is the only international currency, an individual
seller would never use country 2 currency for international trade .
Proof In this case, country 2 seller couldn’t ask country 1 buyer to pay country 2
currency since neither buyer or investor in country 1 holds foreign currency. For country 1
seller, if he accepted country 2 currency for trade settlement, his profit is
pi∗1 ≤  (1− θ)
[
u(q12)− c(q12)/β
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
DM surplus for seller
−F2,
where  is the number of seller trying to accept country 2 currency. If  is not sufficiently
large relative to F2, seller’s profit would be negative thanks to the fixed cost in the banking
sector of country 2.
Notice the difference between this incumbency advantage and the size effect emphasized
by classical literature. Previous studies often argued that the size effect of large economy
would help lower the transaction cost of its currency in foreign exchange market, therefore
justifying its status of international currency. But proposition 1 shows that economy size
alone is not enough. Financial development proves indispensable.
This situation of hysteresis leaves room for policy intervention. Government could pro-
mote the internationalization of its currency by decreasing F through financial reform or
deregulation. Another possibility is for central bank to absorb financial friction by becoming
market maker. In history, FED took advantage of both options after 1913, and the rise-up
of US dollar was largely attributed to that, as vividly described in Eichengreen (2011).
3.4 Monetary policy and international trade
With definition 1, the equilibrium condition for SIC, PCS, and LCS could be outlined, and
comparative statics on monetary policy become possible. On the part of domestic trade,
monetary policy has uniform effect on agent’s welfare level: higher inflation tends to reduce
their gains from trade. On the part of investor, it’s also easy to show that higher inflation
level erodes confidence and drives down financial market liquidity. The effect of monetary
policy on international trade, however, differs according to currency regimes, as shown in
proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Under some general assumptions, higher inflation of international cur-
rency would hurt whoever used it for trade settlement.
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(i) For SIC, higher inflation of international currency would hurt importer and exporter
from both countries, i.e.,
∂q11
∂R1
< 0,
∂q21
∂R1
< 0, ∂pi1∂R1 < 0,
∂pi∗2
∂R1
< 0.
(ii) For PCS, higher inflation of international currency would hurt home exporter and for-
eign importer, i.e., ∂pi1∂R1 < 0,
∂q21
∂R1
< 0.
(iii) For LCS, higher inflation of international currency would hurt home importer and
foreign exporter,i.e.,
∂q11
∂R1
< 0,
∂pi∗2
∂R1
< 0.
Proof in appendix
One interesting observation from proposition 2 is the relationship between nominal ex-
change rate and net export. This model is quite silent on exchange rate partly because,
as shown in proposition 1, it’s the incumbency advantage and financial development that
determines the emergence of international currency. A discussion on monetary policy and
international trade, however, necessitates the inclusion of exchange rate. In particular, the
possibility of ‘beggar thy neighbor’ through nominal depreciation would influence the con-
duct of monetary policy. Now assume Law of One Price (LOP) for nume´raire good holds
in this model, and nominal exchange rate is ei/j ≡ φjφi , where ei/j is the nominal exchange
rate of country i currency per country j currency. Given that φi = (1 + µi)φˆi in station-
ary monetary equilibrium, a higher inflation level of home currency would lead to nominal
depreciation, whose effect on international trade differs according to currency regime.
For SIC, the result is unclear and contingent on parameter value. For PCS, higher infla-
tion and home currency depreciation would hurt home exporter and foreign importer, thus
lowering home export and net export, given that home import is insulated from this shock.
For LCS, home currency depreciation would hurt home importer and foreign exporter, thus
lowering home import and increasing home net export. Therefore, in this model, ‘beggar
thy neighbor’ through nominal depreciation is possible in LCS, impossible in PCS, and un-
certain in hegemony. These observations are summarized in table 5. Of course, the conduct
of monetary policy is over-simplified in model. In reality, a sterilized FX intervention could
depreciate home currency and stabilize money supply at the same time. A more elaborate
model is required for in-depth discussion.
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Table 5: Monetary policy and international trade
Hegemony PCS LCS
home importer
∂q11
∂R1
< 0
∂q12
∂R1
= 0
∂q11
∂R1
< 0
home exporter ∂pi1∂R1 < 0
∂pi1
∂R1
< 0
∂pi∗1
∂R1
= 0
foreign importer
∂q21
∂R1
< 0
∂q21
∂R1
< 0
∂q22
∂R1
= 0
foreign exporter
∂pi∗2
∂R1
< 0 ∂pi2∂R1 = 0
∂pi∗2
∂R1
< 0
home net export ? ∂NX1∂R1 < 0
∂NX1
∂R1
> 0
foreign net export ? ∂NX2∂R1 > 0
∂NX2
∂R1
< 0
Notes: Country 1 is regarded as home country. In the first column, country 1 currency emerged as the
single international currency. For the second column, international trade is settled by seller’s home
currency. For the last column, international trade is settled by buyer’s home currency.
3.5 Welfare analysis and optimal monetary policy
A prominent advantage of monetary search model is the tractability of agent’s asset holding
and welfare level, which is important for the conduct of optimal monetary policy if central
bank is assumed to maximize the social welfare of its own country. In this model, social
welfare consists of seigniorage revenue, gains from trade, and a loss from banking sector’s
fixed cost if this country issues international currency. For simplicity, additional welfare
gain from consuming nume´raire good is omitted.
If country 1 issues the only international currency, for example, social welfare level at
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the end of each period is the following.
W1 = µ1σφ1m
2
1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Seigniorage revenue
+n11
[
βu(q11)− c(q11)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
domestic trade surplus
+n12θ
[
βu(q11)− c(q11)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
importer surplus
+ n21
{[
1− F1
(1− 2σ)φ1z1
]( 1
1 +R1
)
φ1m
2
1 − c(q21)
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
exporter surplus
−F1
W2 =− µ1σφ1m21 + n22
[
βu(q22)− c(q22)
]
+ n21θ
[
βu(q21)− c(q21)
]
+ n12
{[
1− F1
(1− 2σ)φ1z1
]( 1
1 +R1
)
φ1m
1
1 − c(q11)
}
With similar procedure, the welfare level for PCS and LCS is shown in appendix.
From previous assumptions and proposition 2, each country’s gain from international
trade is decreasing in the nominal interest rate of international currency. For seigniorage
revenue, recall that central bank’s lump-sum transfer is only applied to domestic agent,
and other agents need to purchase that currency in CM. Therefore, seigniorage revenue
is possible only when there’s foreign demand for that country’s currency. Without loss of
generality, assume seigniorage revenue is increasing in the growth rate of money supply,
which gives incentive to deviate from Friedman rule.
Seigniorage revenue would cancel out in the summation of each country’s welfare, so
Friedman rule is optimal for a social planner trying to maximize total welfare. In addition,
it’s inefficient to issue two international currencies since that would incur fixed cost of bank-
ing sector in both countries. Social planner would let a country with lower F issue a single
international currency. For each country aimed at maximizing its own welfare, Friedman
rule is not optimal if there’s foreign demand of its currency, which includes the case of PCS
and hegemony when a country issues the only international currency. These observations
are summarized in proposition 3.
Proposition 3 In a stationary monetary equilibrium with international trade, Fried-
man rule of zero nominal interest rate is not always optimal.
1. For social planner trying to maximize total welfare, Friedman rule is optimal, and coun-
tries with higher degree of financial development would issue international currency.
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2. For central bank trying to maximize the social welfare of its own country, Friedman
rule is not optimal when there’s is foreign demand of its currency.
Figure 3 shows the second case of central bank facing trade off between seigniorage revenue
and gains from trade. It plots the relationship between nominal interest rate and the welfare
level of a country that issues the only international currency. For illustration, the function
form is borrowed from Lagos and Wright (2005) with u(q) = ln(q+b)− ln(q), c(q) = q, b =
0.0001. Additionally, α = 0.5, β = 0.966, σ = 0.3, θ = 0.5, F = 0.01. Friedman rule is
clearly not optimal, since the welfare level is maximized around 16% of nominal interest
rate. Also, the status of international currency would be lost if nominal interest rate is
raised above 25%, putting a limit central bank’s conduct of monetary policy, which has
been intensively discussed in Zhang (2014).
Figure 3: Optimal monetary policy
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One interpretation of proposition 3 is to regard international currency as public good, in
the spirit of Kindleberger (1986). Center country makes investment in banking sector and
financial institution to facilitate trade. Peripheral country takes advantage of international
currency as well as the system of payment and settlement. Seigniorage revenue conveys
negative externality since center country tends to inflate and overproduce international
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currency, and that would hurt the rest of world. For a social planner, that externality is
internalized and canceled out, retaining Friedman rule as the optimal monetary policy.
4 Discussion of related topic
4.1 Size effect
Classical and recent literature uniformly favored large economy as provider of international
currency due to size effect. For example, Devereux and Shi (2013) built a DSGE model
for quantitative analysis, and concluded that large country is in a good position to provide
international currency, since large trade volume would reduce transaction cost in FX market.
In what follows I would use a numerical example to re-evaluate this issue.
In my model, economy size is approximated by national population, i.e., the total number
of buyer, seller, and investor. A change in population would, according to matching function,
directly influence the number and probability of the meeting between buyer and seller,
thus affecting equilibrium outcome. Figure 4 shows the relationship for center country’s
population and its optimal nominal interest rate. Parameter value and function forms are
identical to those in figure 3. Center country’s population is ranged from 0.1 to 10, while
peripheral country’s population stays at 1. A hump-shape is surprising at first sight, but the
composition of center country’s welfare in figure 5 demystifies everything. In essence, size
effect alters the degree of trade-off between seigniorage revenue and gains from trade. For
a large economy, gains from domestic trade dominate its total welfare, so higher inflation
is not a good choice. Similarly, gains from international trade makes up the biggest part
of welfare for a small open economy, reducing the attractiveness of reaping seigniorage
revenue. It’s therefore reasonable to think of figure 4 as a continuation of proposition 3
in exploration of center country’s optimal monetary policy. Size effect is crucial here not
because of its absolute value, but in affecting the desirability of seigniorage revenue: if gains
from trade loom larger and larger from size effect, convergence to Friedman rule becomes a
better choice. In other words, it is the structure of economy, the share of trade in its total
welfare, that determines whether a country is qualified as natural provider of international
currency.
To summarize, hegemony is reasonable for a unipolar world dominated by economic
superpower, while multiple international currencies make sense in a multipolar world with
evenly distributed economy size.
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Figure 4: Size effect
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Figure 5: Welfare decomposition
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4.2 Global imbalance
The 2008 financial crisis brought into attention the huge current account deficit of United
States, known as global imbalance now. Many studies regard it as transitory phenomenon
due to the saving glut of Asian countries (Bernanke, 2005) or the monetary policies of United
states and exchange rate policy of emerging countries (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2009). My
model of international currency, however, illustrates that global imbalance is a sustainable
and structural symptom arising from the arrangement of monetary system. If there’s only
a single international currency, the center country would have trade deficit at equilibrium
in a perfect symmetric model, whereas multiple international currencies would help reduce
this global imbalance.
Now consider a perfect symmetric two country model where both countries are identical
in size, openness, and monetary policy, so that n12 = n21, p12 = p21, p11 = p22, R1 = R2 >
0. If country 1 issues the only international currency, equilibrium condition indicates
R1 = (p11 + p12)L(q
1
1) = p21L(q
2
1),
which naturally leads to the observation that q11 > q
2
1, given p11 + p12 > p21 and L
′(q) < 0.
From terms of trade, φm = (1 − θ)u(q) + θ c(q)β , so φ1m11 > φ1m21. Intuitively, country 1
buyer would hold more real balance of country 1 currency since he expects a higher chance
of meeting with home or foreign seller, while country 2 buyer would hold less real balance of
international currency since his trade with home sellers is still settled in country 2 currency.
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The trade balance for country 1 is therefore
TB1 ≡ EX1 − IM1 = n21q21 − n12q11 < 0.
Obviously, even in a perfect symmetric model, the single issuing country of international
currency would have persistent trade deficit, which doesn’t hold for other currency regimes.
In PCS, R1 = p11L(q11) = p21L(q21)R2 = p12L(q12) = p22L(q22)
With q21 = q
1
2, trade balance of both countries is zero. Similarly for LCSR1 = (p11 + p12)L(q11)R2 = (p22 + p21)L(q22)
With q11 = q
2
2, trade balance is also zero for both countries. This finding echoes Liu and
Zhou (2015), who built a DSGE model to show the sustainability of US current account
deficit resulting from the status of dollar as an international currency9.
It should be cautioned here this model doesn’t provide any normative analysis on global
imbalance, since agents would always benefit from international trade, irrelevant with cur-
rent account surplus or deficit. So this application only states that a system of multiple
international currencies is desirable if global imbalance proves problematic.
The case of asymmetric model is complicated and sensitive to parameter value. For
simplicity, the following discussion is limited to the case of hegemony where country 1 issues
the only international currency. First consider the effect of monetary policy. Differentiate
the trade balance of country 1 with respect to the nominal interest rate of country 1, and
the result follows.
∂TB1
∂R1
=
1
R1
[
EX1
L(q21)
− IM1
L(q11)
]
, L(q) ≡ ∂L
∂q
q
L
From this, the effect of monetary policy on current account is crucially dependent on the
9The mechanism of their model is quite different from mine. Like most invoicing currency model, they
presumed CIA to introduce fiat money. US dollar is also exogenously assumed to be the only international
currency. US trade deficit is determined by foreign demand of dollar. With positive long-run growth of
global economy, there would be a structural global imbalance, whose magnitude is affected by the degree of
openness, substitution elasticity between home and foreign goods, and the relative size of US economy to
the rest of world.
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elasticity of liquidity premium and trade volume: if EX1
L(q
2
1)
> IM1
L(q
1
1)
, higher level of interest
rate would deteriorate center country’s current account, otherwise inflation would help
reduce global imbalance. Next consider country size effect, illustrated in figure 6 and 7 with
numerical example. Both figures plot the relationship between the population and current
account of the country that issues the only international currency. The function form and
parameter value still follows those in figure 3, with the only exception of α that represents
preference shock. The level of nominal interest rate is welfare-maximizing. With a low
level of α, as in figure 6, there’s no monotone relationship between country size and trade
balance, whereas global imbalance deepened with population when α is relatively high in
figure 7.
Figure 6: Asymmetric case: α = 0.2
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Figure 7: Asymmetric case: α = 0.5
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4.3 International vehicle currency
The model could be easily extended into N-country case to account for the emergence of
IVC. Model details and equilibrium conditions are derived in appendix for 3-country model.
Here I would show a main finding from model implication: sellers in different countries would
choose the same settlement currency for the export to a certain country, as long as they
are identical in bargaining power and cost function. In other words, sellers display herding
behavior in their choice of settlement currency.
Consider country j seller’s profit from trade with country i buyer, settled in country k
currency, and its expression follows.
pikij =
(
1− Fk
(1− 2σ)φkzk
)
1
1 +Rk
φkm
i
k − cj(qik)
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Notice that seller’s feature would influence only terms of trade and cost function: higher
level of bargaining power brings in better terms of trade, and efficient production improves
profitability. If sellers are identical in these two aspects, their profit would be equal for the
export to a certain country, which leads to the rise of a common IVC to reduce financial
friction. Therefore, exporter of commodity or homogeneous good would choose the same
currency for settlement, which is consistent with empirical literature. Goldberg and Tille
(2008) showed that US dollar is the dominant invoicing currency for the international trade
of commodity and homogeneous goods10.
5 Concluding remarks
China has been trying to internationalize RMB since great recession, and several measures
are taken to accelerate this process, including currency swap agreement, offshore market de-
velopment, cross-border trade settlement, and capital account liberalization. Among these,
trade settlement is a natural starting point given China’s leading role in merchandise trade.
In contrast with traditional view of thick market externality and natural monopoly, recent
literature highlighted the importance of a deep and liquid financial market. In this paper,
I verified this finding with SWIFT trade finance data, and built a two-country monetary
search model to discuss the determinants of international currency. This illustrative model
also emphasized government’s role in taking initiative to foster market, and explored the
conduct of monetary policy in different regimes. For future research, modeling financial
market in a more meaningful way is desirable for asset pricing as well as the impact of
capital account liberalization.
RMB’s recent success in joining SDR basket reaffirmed China’s grand plan of finan-
cial reform and deregulation, although the outcome of such bold action remains uncertain,
especially given the recent chaos in stock market. A monetary system with multiple inter-
national currencies is beneficial to United States, who has been long accused of exorbitant
privilege, as well as peripheral countries often criticized for excessive reserve accumulation.
Whether RMB is a qualified candidate in this race to new world, we shall wait and see.
10Their explanation for this phenomenon is different. They argued that commodity price shows excessive
volatility, and IVC is used to reduce exchange rate risk.
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A Appendix
A.1 Data source and description
Name Description expected
sign
Source
Activity share the share of a country’s
export/import in world total
+ SWIFT dataset
MT400&700
Inflation year on year change of CPI - IMF
Inflation volatility coefficient of variation
for monthly inflation
- IMF
Exchange rate nominal exchange rate
against USD, in log
- IMF
Exchange rate volatility coefficient of variation
for monthly exchange rate
- IMF
Private credit / GDP financial resources provided
to private sector by financial
corporations, in log
+ World Bank
Chinn-Ito index a de jure measure of capital
account openness
+ Chinn and Ito (2006)
Export differentiation the share of differentiated
goods in total export, in log
+ UN comtrade
Rauch (1999)
Real GDP in log + World Bank
A.2 Letter of credit step by step
Figure 1 shows the working mechanism of LC. The following step of LC is in order.
Step 1 Exporter and importer determine terms of trade and sign business contract.
Step 2 Importer would go to issuing bank, show the contract, and apply for LC. The issuing
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bank usually asks for a certain amount of collateral from importer before LC is issued.
Letter of credit is “a commitment by a bank on behalf of the buyer that payment
would be made to the beneficiary provided that the terms and conditions stated in
LC has been met, consisting of the presentation of specified documents” (US depart-
ment of commerce). The issuing bank would make payment only a certain days after
shipment, and that’s the maturity of LC, usually around 3 months.
Step 3 The issuing bank would send LC to advising bank for scrutiny.
Step 4 After checking details, advising bank would notify exporter so that he could prepare
shipment.
Step 5 Exporter makes shipment and gets the required document, especially bill of lading
(B/L).
Bill of lading is a document issued by carrier which details a shipment of merchandise
and gives title of that shipment to a specified party, usually its holder.
Step 6 Exporter sends required document to advising bank for payment.
Step 7 After checking the required document, advising bank would notify the issuing bank.
In principle, exporter needs to wait until maturity of LC, but he is usually in urgent
need of liquidity, so advising bank would make payment to exporter at discount.
Step 8 The principle of “borrow short and lend long” makes advising bank unwilling to hold
LC, given its short maturity. Advising bank would sell combine LC and other required
documents as trade acceptance and sell it to any interested parties.
The set of documents including LC and B/L is referred to as trade acceptance or
banker’s acceptance, whose payment is guaranteed by both issuing bank and advising
bank, making it attractive for short-term investment.
Step 9 Upon maturity, anyone holding trade acceptance could go to issuing bank for pay-
ment. After checking the required document, issuing bank would notify importer.
The importer then makes payment and gets shipment.
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A.3 Equilibrium condition of different currency regimes
According to definition 1, the equilibrium condition for country 1 currency to emerge as the
single international currency is the following.
For buyer R1 = (p11 + p12)L(q11) = p21L(q21) (1.1)R2 = p22L(q22) (1.2)
For seller 
pi1 =
[
1− F1(1−2σ)φ1z1
](
1
1+R1
)
φ1m
2
1 − c(q21) > 0 (1.3)
pi∗2 =
[
1− F1(1−2σ)φ1z1
](
1
1+R1
)
φ1m
1
1 − c(q11) > 0 (1.4)
For investor
R1 =
n1,2φ1m
1
1 + n2,1φ1m
2
1
(1− 2σ)φ1z1 − 1 (1.5)
For money marketσφ1m11 + σφ1m21 + (1− 2σ)φ1z1 + F1 = φ1M1 (1.6)σφ2m22 = φ2M2 (1.7)
If equations (1.1)-(1.8) are satisfied at the same time, country 1 currency would emerge as
the only international currency. Similarly, the equilibrium condition for PCS is the following.
For buyer R1 = p11L(q11) = p21L(q21) (2.1.1)R2 = p12L(q12) = p22L(q22) (2.1.2)
For seller pi1 > 0, pi1 > pi∗1 (2.1.3)pi2 > 0, pi2 > pi∗2 (2.1.4)
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For investor R1 =
n21φ1q21
(1−2σ)φ1z1 − 1 (2.1.5)
R2 =
n12φ2q12
(1−2σ)φ2z2 − 1 (2.1.6)
For money marketσφ1m11 + σφ1m21 + (1− 2σ)φ1z1 + F1 = φ1M1 (2.1.7)σφ2m22 + σφ2m12 + (1− 2σ)φ2z2 + F2 = φ2M2 (2.1.8)
For LCS, equilibrium condition is the following.
For buyer R1 = (p11 + p12)L(q11) (2.2.1)R2 = (p22 + p21)L(q22) (2.2.2)
For seller pi∗1 > 0 (2.2.3)pi∗2 > 0 (2.2.4)
For investor R1 =
n12φ1q11
(1−2σ)φ1z1 − 1 (2.2.5)
R2 =
n21φ2q22
(1−2σ)φ2z2 − 1 (2.2.6)
For money market σφ1m11 + (1− 2σ)φ1z1 + F1 = φ1M1 (2.2.7)σφ2m22 + (1− 2σ)φ2z2 + F2 = φ2M2 (2.2.8)
A.4 Proof of proposition 2
Most of this proof is straightforward except the part of exporter’s gain from international
trade, which requires additional assumption on function form.
Lemma 1 If exporter’s financial loss is more sensitive than DM cost function in re-
sponse to interest rate shock, i.e., (f + c) > 0 , exporter’s gain from international trade is
decreasing in nominal interest rate, i.e., ∂pi∂R < 0.
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Proof Let βE ≡ (1 − F(1−2σ)φz )(1 + R)−1 denote the effective discount factor for seller.
Without loss of generality, assume βE < β so that financial friction would reduce seller’s
gain from trade. Therefore, (β − βE) > 0 is a measure of seller’s financial loss. Combine
the expression of buyer’s payment in DM and seller’s profit in section (3.2.4), I could get
pi = βE(1− θ)
[
u(q)− c(q)
β
]
− 1
β
(β − βE)c(q).
Given that ∂φz∂R < 0, it’s easy to find that
∂βE
∂R < 0. With the previous condition in
proportional bargaining, q < q∗, u′(q∗) = c′(q∗)β , u′ < 0, c′ > 0, the first item is decreased
in R.
For the second item, differentiate with respect to R, I could get cfβR(f + c), where
f ≡ (β − βE) captures the degree of seller’s financial loss, f ≡ ∂f∂R Rf is the elasticity of
financial loss on nominal interest rate. Similarly, c is the elasticity of seller’s DM cost in
response to interest rate shock. Obviously, f > 0, c < 0. A sufficient condition for
∂pi
∂R < 0
is f + c > 0. Therefore, as long as financial loss is more sensitive to the change of nominal
interest rate, higher inflation level would decrease exporter’s gain from international trade.
Another helpful observation is the property of buyer’s liquidity premium. Recall its defini-
tion.
L(q) ≡
θ(u′(q)− c′(q)β )
(1− θ)u′(q) + θ c′(q)β
Take differentiation with respect to q, I could get the following result.
L′(q) =
θ
β
[
(1− θ)u′(q) + θ
β
c′(q)
]−2
(u′′c′ − u′c′′)
With previous assumption on function form, u′ > 0, c′ > 0, u′′ < 0, c′′ > 0, it’s obvious
that L′(q) < 0, so buyer’s liquidity premium is decreasing in his trade volume. After these
preparations, now it’s easy to prove proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 2
On the part of exporters, assume f + c > 0 always holds.
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For single international currency
∂q11
∂R1
= ((p11 + p12)L
′(q11))−1 < 0
∂q21
∂R1
= (p21L
′(q21))−1 < 0
 ∂pi1∂R1 < 0∂pi∗2
∂R1
< 0
For PCS 
∂q12
∂R1
= 0
∂q21
∂R1
= (p21L
′(q21))−1 < 0
 ∂pi1∂R1 < 0∂pi2
∂R1
= 0
For LCS 
∂q12
∂R1
= ((p11 + p12)L
′(q11))−1 < 0
∂q22
∂R1
= 0

∂pi∗1
∂R1
= 0
∂pi∗2
∂R1
< 0
A.4.1 Welfare level
For PCS, the welfare level is the following.
W1 =µ1σφ1m
2
1 − µ2σφ2m12︸ ︷︷ ︸
Seigniorage revenue
+n11
[
βu(q11)− c(q11)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
domestic trade surplus
+n12θ
[
βu(q12)− c(q12)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
importer surplus
+ n21
{[
1− F1
(1− 2σ)φ1z1
]( 1
1 +R1
)
φ1m
2
1 − c(q21)
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
exporter surplus
−F1
W2 =µ2σφ2m
1
2 − µ1σφ1m21 + n22
[
βu(q22)− c(q22)
]
+ n21θ
[
βu(q21)− c(q21)
]
+ n12
{[
1− F2
(1− 2σ)φ2z2
]( 1
1 +R2
)
φ2m
1
2 − c(q12)
}
− F2
For LCS, welfare level is the following.
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W1 =n11
[
βu(q11)− c(q11)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
domestic trade surplus
+n12θ
[
βu(q11)− c(q11)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
importer surplus
+ n21
{[
1− F2
(1− 2σ)φ2z2
]( 1
1 +R2
)
φ2m
2
2 − c(q22)
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
exporter surplus
−F1
W2 =n22
[
βu(q22)− c(q22)
]
+ n21θ
[
βu(q22)− c(q22)
]
+ n12
{[
1− F1
(1− 2σ)φ1z1
]( 1
1 +R1
)
φ2m
1
1 − c(q11)
}
− F2
A.5 Three-country model
The potential payment system in three-country model is quite numerous, and this part is
concerned about the rise of international vehicle currency (IVC), which is used to settle
trade between non-issuing countries. The assumption in two-country model could be easily
applied here, requiring only minor change of notation. ∀i, j, k ∈ 1, 2, 3, pij is the probability
of successful matching between country i buyer and country j seller; nij is the corresponding
number of meeting; qij is country i buyer’s holding of country j currency; pi
k
ij is country j
seller’s profit from his trade with country i buyer, settled in country k currency. Most
importantly, here I assume sellers in different countries are identical in bargaining power
and cost function, so that the consistency from proposition 4 would hold. For simplicity,
the following discussion covers only the case of single and double international currency.
A.5.1 Single dominance
Now consider a case of hegemony in three-country model, assuming country 1 issues the
only international currency. Figure 8 shows the payment system in this case, where all the
international trade is settled in country 1 currency. The following equilibrium condition is
in order.
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For buyer
R1 = (p11 + p12 + p13)L(q
1
1) = (p21 + p23)L(q
2
1) = (p31 + p32)L(q
3
1) (3.1.1)
R2 = p22L(q
2
2) (3.1.2)
R3 = p33L(q
3
3) (3.1.3)
For seller pi121 = pi123 = J1φ1m21 − c(q21) > 0 (3.1.4)pi131 = pi132 = J1φ1m31 − c(q31) > 0 (3.1.5)
For investor
[
(1− 2σ)φ1z1
]
(1 +R1) = (n12 + n13)φ1m
1
1 + (n21 + n23)φ1m
2
1 + (n31 + n32)φ1m
3
1 (3.1.6)
Money market
σ(φ1m
1
1 + φ1m
2
1 + φ1m
3
1) + (1− σ)φ1z1 + F1 = φ1M1 (3.1.7)
σφ2m
2
2 = φ2M2 (3.1.8)
σφ3m
3
3 = φ3M3 (3.1.9)
The incumbency advantage from proposition 1 still applies here: as long as individual sellers
enjoy positive profit from international trade, they have no incentive to deviate from the
existing equilibrium.
A.5.2 Dual dominance: PCS
Now consider the case of double international currencies where the international trade
between country 1 and 2 is settled through PCS, while country 3 relies on other country’s
currency for settlement. To achieve consistency of decision, country 3 sellers choose country
1 currency to settle trade with country 2, which is the same as country 1 seller’s choice.
Apply a similar procedure to other seller’s choice, and the payment pattern is shown in
figure 9, with the following equilibrium condition. For buyer
R1 = p11L(q
1
1) = (p21 + p23)L(q
2
1) = (p31 + p32)L(q
3
1) (3.2.1)
R2 = p22L(q
2
2) = (p13 + p12)L(q
1
2) (3.2.2)
R3 = p33L(q
3
3) (3.2.3)
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For seller 
pi212 = pi
2
13 = J2φ2m
1
2 − c(q12) > 0 (3.2.4)
pi121 = pi
1
23 = J1φ1m
2
1 − c(q21) > 0 (3.2.5)
pi131 = pi
1
32 = J1φ1m
3
1 − c(q31) > 0 (3.2.6)
pi121 > pi
2
21 ⇒ J1φ2m12 − c(q12) > J2φ2m22 − c(q22) (3.2.7)
pi212 > pi
1
12 ⇒ J2φ2m12 − c(q12) > J1φ1m11 − c(q11) (3.2.8)
For investor
[
(1− 2σ)φ1z1
]
(1 +R1) = (n21 + n23)φ1m
2
1 + (n31 + n32)φ1m
3
1 (3.2.9)[
(1− 2σ)φ2z2
]
(1 +R2) = (n12 + n13)φ2m
1
2 (3.2.10)
Money market
σ(φ1m
1
1 + φ1m
2
1 + φ1m
3
1) + (1− 2σ)φ1z1 + F1 = φ1M1 (3.2.11)
σ(φ2m
2
2 + φ2m
1
2) + (1− 2σ)φ2z2 + F2 = φ2M2 (3.2.12)
σφ3m
3
3 = φ3M3 (3.2.13)
With double international currencies, the incumbency advantage in proposition 1 is no
longer present. The existence of such equilibrium requires not only positive profit for sellers,
but also the incentive-compatible condition in (3.2.7) and (3.2.8), otherwise deviation is
justified.
A.5.3 Dual dominance: LCS
For another possibility of double international currency, assume the trade between country
1 and 2 to be settled through LCS. Figure 10 shows the payment system, and several
equilibrium conditions follow. For buyer
R1 = (p11 + p12 + p13)L(q
1
1) = (p31 + p32)L(q
3
1) (3.3.1)
R2 = (p22 + p21 + p23)L(q
2
2) (3.3.2)
R3 = p33L(q
3
3) (3.3.3)
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For seller 
pi112 = pi
1
13 = J1φ1m
1
1 − c(q11) > 0 (3.3.4)
pi221 = pi
2
23 = J2φ2m
2
2 − c(q22) > 0 (3.3.5)
pi131 = pi
1
32 = J1φ1m
3
1 − c(q31) > 0 (3.3.6)
For investor
[
(1− 2σ)φ1z1
]
(1 +R1) = (n12 + n13)φ1m
2
1 + (n31 + n32)φ1m
3
1 (3.3.7)[
(1− 2σ)φ2z2
]
(1 +R2) = (n21 + n23)φ2m
2
2 (3.3.8)
Money market 
σ(φ1m
1
1 + φ1m
3
1) + (1− 2σ)φ1z1 + F1 = φ1M1 (3.3.9)
σφ2m
2
2 + (1− 2σ)φ2z2 + F2 = φ2M2 (3.3.10)
σφ3m
3
3 = φ3M3 (3.3.13)
One interesting feature in this system is the pattern of IVC. For PCS in figure 9, the trade
between country 2 and 3 is completely settled by country 1 currency, while for LCS in figure
10, there’s no such dominant IVC.
Figure 8: Three-country model: single international currency
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Figure 9: Three-country model: dual international currency, PCS
Figure 10: Three-country model: dual international currency, LCS
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